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Abstract
This paper presents the results of an analysis of the English modals CAN and MAY in four
text types covering the domain of Contract Law. These results show a distinct difference
between the two modals, which is interesting because the meaning and use of CAN and MAY
is generally taken to be more blurred than it is the case here. The meaning and use of the
modals is analysed and compared on the basis of logico-semantic and pragmatic parameters
briefly introduced in the paper. The analysis is part of a major contrastive analysis of the
meaning and use of the Danish and English modals.
The central English modals have been the subject of a great number of
linguistic studies in recent years1, and the same goes for English and
American legal discourse2, but until now there has not been any analysis
published which has combined the two and focussed on the meaning and use
of the modals in English legal discourse. In this paper I will present the
results of such an analysis, viz. the meaning and use of the modals CAN and
MAY in the four text types 1. Statutes, rules and regulations, 2. Travaux
préparatoires3, 3. Judgments, and 4. Contracts in the corpus of Contract Law.
                                                
1 Notably Coates, 1983; Leech, 1987; Palmer, 1986, 1988, 1990, and Perkins, 1983 as
well as Davidsen-Nielsen’s 1990 constrastive study of tense and mood in English and Danish.
2 Cf. e.g. Crystal & Davy, 1969; Danet, 1980, 1985; Kurzon, 1986, 1989; Levi, 1986;
and Maley, 1987.
3 The labels for the three of the text types should be self-explanatory. As far as text
type II is concerned, I stick to the terminology introduced by the corpus compilation project
team even though it is not an especially felicitous term seen from the point of view of English
alone. Travaux préparatoires is a cover term for working papers, report from law
commissions and similar texts.
These results are all part of a major contrastive project on the meaning and
use of the modals in English and Danish legal discourse4, cf. Lauridsen (in
preparation).
The analysis of the English modals which will be presented in the
following distinguishes itself in at least three different ways: First of all, it is
not an analysis of a set of linguistic items (in this case the modals) in general,
but an analysis of the conditions under which we find these items in
specifically defined parts of legal discourse and the study is thus a
contribution to the analysis and description of one of the many so-called
languages for special purposes (LSPs), a branch of linguistic research which
has obtained an increasing amount of interest in the last couple of decades.
Secondly, it extracts its data from a large text corpus, viz. the corpus of
Contract Law. Previous analyses of legal discourse have generally been
based on relatively small amounts of data even though they have adopted an
empirical approach, and the machine-readable text corpus which has so far
been available for large-scale linguistic analysis (that is, the LOB corpus for
British English) only comprises a few text samples from the domain of legal
discourse5. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other text corpora of
one million words or more available within the domain of legal discourse,
and analyses using data from the contract law corpora of each one million
words are therefore unique because of their solid database.
Finally, the study of the English modals is potentially contrastive
because there are two other corpora of contract law (French and Danish)
which have been compiled according to the same principles as those
governing the English corpus and which may therefore supply comparable
data. Further, it is potentially contrastive because the analysis of the modals
is carried out within the framework of a semantic taxonomy of modality
which is not language specific and which may therefore also be applied to
                                                
4 The project has been partly financed by the Danish Research Council for the
Humanities, 1991.
5 In the so-called LOB corpus, cf. Johansson, Stig et al. (1978) we find two samples
under category H (Miscellaneous), subcategory Government documents/Acts and Treaties,
and three samples under category J (Learned and scientific writings), subcategory Political
science, law, education.
analyses of modal expressions in other languages or even other analyses of
English modals, for instance with data from other domains or text types.
1. The semantic taxonomy
The semantic taxonomy used in the categorization of the modals is a further
development of what I have described previously, cf. Lauridsen (1988) and
(in print). Modality is defined as a general, not language-specific category
which may be expressed by means of different grammatical categories in the
individual languages: for English in the oblique moods of the verb phrase
(imperative and the rudimentary subjunctive plus certain uses of the
indicative), modal verbs, tense, and finally it may be lexicalized or expressed
by means of certain syntactic structures such as conditional clauses6.
The modal categories which constitute the semantic taxonomy are
regarded as imprecise, Boolean categories; their definition is based on the
logical concept of possible worlds and the classic operators of modal logic,
possibility and necessity.
The concept of possible worlds may be defined as the idea that things
might be or might have been other than they actually are or were, cf. Rescher
(1979). A proposition may thus be true in a given world (real or imagined),
but false in another. Moreover, the concept may cover the situation in a given
world, for instance the real world, at different points in time, cf. Prior (1957).
(1) The hearing is at 10 o'clock
(2) The hearing may be at 10 o'clock
(3) The hearing must be at 10 o'clock
In the examples above, the factual example (1) without a modal verb
expresses that its propositional content is true in the real world; (2) with the
modal may expresses that there is a possible world in which the propositional
content is true, and (3) with the modal must that the propositional content is
true in all possible worlds. The concept of possible worlds is thus used in this
study as a prerequisite for the semantic categorization of modality in order to
show that facts of the real world may or must be different.
                                                
6 Cf. Perkins, 1983.
In modal logic, the two so-called modal operators possibility and
necessity are interrelated as follows:
(4) pos p = non nec non p
nec p = non pos non p
The abbreviation pos signifies the modal operator of possibility, and nec that
of necessity, p is the proposition that follows the modal expression, in other
words, the whole utterance/sentence except for the modality marker, in this
case the modal verb. The formula is to be read as follows: "If it is possible
that p, it is not necessary that non-p; and if it is necessary that p, it is not
possible that non-p".
(5) The parties may exclude the doctrine of substantial performance by an express provision of the contract (I)
(6) The innocent party must have obtained a benefit from the partial performance of an entire contract by the party in breach
In (5) and (6) the logical operators of possibility and necessity are expressed;
may in (5) has the possibility operator among its semantic features  and may
therefore be paraphrased as "It is possible that p", where p is "The parties
exclude the doctrine of substantial performance by an express provision of
the contract". Similarly, must in (6) has the necessity operator among its
semantic features and may be paraphrased as "It is necessary (i.e. necessarily
the case) that p", where p is "The innocent party has obtained a benefit from
the partial performance of an entire contract by the party in breach".
When we take into consideration the concept of possible worlds as well
as the relevant categories of modal logic, modality may thus be understood as
the grammaticalization or lexicalization, first, of the speaker's attitude
concerning the possibility or necessity of whether a given proposition is true
or false (epistemic modality) or, second, of a modal source's attitude
concerning the bringing about of a given event or situation (deontic
modality). By modal source is understood the person or institution that is the
original sender of the modal proposition. Third, modality may be the
grammaticalization or lexicalization of the possibility, or necessity of a given
characteristic supposed to be inherent in the referent of the noun phrase
which constitutes the subject of the modalized expression (dynamic
modality).
The distinctions between epistemic and deontic modality and between
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/ The speaker orders him to
ask for a  second hearing”)
Table 1
The semantic distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic modality is
reflected in a range of syntactico-semantic differences between the modals
expressing these two subcategories, cf. Lauridsen (1988) and (in print).
In the following, the distinction between the two modal operators possibility
and necessity need not concern us any further because the modals CAN  and
MAY are both expressions of the possibility operator. The distinction
between epistemic and non-epistemic modality is highly relevant in the
following, whereas the subcategorization of non-epistemic modality into
deontic and dynamic modality only plays a minor role.
2. The modals as implicitly performative verbs
As it is apparent from the above, it is quite obvious that this  study has taken
as its starting point the meaning and form of the modals rather than their
function. But in the English and American literature on the subject, language
pertaining to the legal profession has been considered from various
functional points of view7, notably that of speech act theory,
and since parts of such pragmatically oriented
descriptions are relevant for the analysis of the modals in
legal discourse also, I shall briefly comment on some of
them here.
Traditional speech act theory as it was originally
outlined by Austin (1962) makes a basic distinction
between constative and performative utterances.
Constative utterances are statements; their function is to
describe some event, process or state-of-affairs, and they
(or the propositions expressed) have the property of being
either true or false. In contrast to this, performative
utterances do not have a truth-value; they are used to do
something, rather than to say that something is or is not
the case (Lyons (1977:726)). For instance, a speech act of
permission (You may ... / I allow you to ... / Go ahead!) or
a speech act of order (You must ... / I order you to ... /
Come here!) cannot be true or false, but it may be said to
be felicitous or infelicitous depending on a set of
circumstantial conditions, cf. Lyons (1977:733ff).
Let us consider once more examples (1)-(2) quoted
above. (1) will typically be interpreted as a categorical
(non-modalized) statement with a truth value, in other
words, it may be said to be either true or false. In Austin's
terms it is a constative utterance, that is, non-
performative. The modalized (non-categorical) utterance
in (2) may be interpreted as constative or performative
utterances, depending on its context. Just as it is the case
with most modals, may can express epistemic as well as
deontic modality; if the context triggers off an epistemic
interpretation, the utterance is constative, but if the modal
is interpreted as expressing deontic modality, the
utterances may be performative. Thus, may in (2) can be
paraphrased as a performative utterance as in "I (=the
                                                
7 Cf. Danet, 1980, 1985; Kurzon, 1986; Maley, 1987.
deontic source / a person in authority) permit / allow p"
(where p is still the main proposition, in this case, "the
hearing be at 10 o'clock"), or it may be paraphrased as a
non-performative (constative) utterance as in "It is
possible (for X) to p".
Austin (1962) made a basic distinction between
primary and explicitly performative utterances; the latter
contained an explicitly performative verb such as allow
and permit, whereas the former did not (cf. also Lyons
(1977:728ff)). Thus, Come in! would be a primary
performative utterance, whereas I allow / permit you to
come in would be an explicit performative. In a certain
sense, performative utterances where the performative
element is one of the modals under investigation in this
study, may be said to be somewhere on a scale between
primary performatives and explicit performatives as far as
directness of the performative element is concerned. With
this in mind recent studies, cf. e.g. Kurzon (1986), labels
the modals in this function implicitly performative verbs,
and I shall adopt this term in the following8.
As it appears from the discussion of (1)-(2) above, the
epistemic modals do not occur as implicitly performative
verbs, which is obviously due to the fact that epistemic
modals evaluate the truth value of the main proposition
and can therefore not be said to be performing an event in
the same sense as it is the case with the deontic modals.
The deontic modals, on the other hand, often occur as
implicit performatives.
Whether utterances containing a deontic modal are
meant to be interpreted as constative or performative
                                                
8 After the publication of Austin (1962), the problems and further development of his
theories have been widely discussed within various branches of linguistics. Any discussion of
this falls outside the scope of this study, however; for an overview, cf. Lyons (1977: chapter
16). What I need for my purposes is the distinction between constative and performative
utterances exemplified above.
depends on the linguistic context in close connection with
the real-world situation in which the utterance occurs, and
a full interpretation is only possible if one takes into
consideration the linguistic as well as the non-linguistic
elements of the utterance. The situational context relevant
for the interpretation of the modals as implicitly
performative or non-performative verbs is first and
foremost the sender-receiver relations, and since these are
to a very large extent institutionalized in the text types
under investigation here, it becomes relatively simple to
account for them.
In the following the sender - receiver relations will be
included in order to account for the semantic and
functional distinction between CAN and MAY, both of them
modals expressing the possibility operator. However,
further elaboration of this falls outside the scope of this
paper.
3. Analysis of the modals CAN and MAY in the
Contract Law texts
Below the two modals of possibility will be analysed in
turn whereupon they will be compared semantically
and functionally.
3.1.  Analysis of CAN
In text type I (Statutes, rules and regulations) of the
corpus there are only a few examples with CAN, all of
them of the kind exemplified in (7)-(9):
(7) An act to impose further limits on the extent to which under
the law of England and Wales and Northern Ireland civil
liability for breach of contract or for negligence or other
breach of duty, can be avoided by means of contract terms and
otherwise, and under the law of Scotland civil liability can be avoided by means of contract terms (I)
All the examples with CAN in text type I express non-
performative root possibility. I have chosen the term root
possibility in stead of trying to distinguish between deontic
and dynamic possibility because in a lot of instances it is a
question of interpretation whether one would classify a
given example with CAN as one or the other. Even though
there are clear-cut examples, especially if the modal occurs
in a context which is lexically and/or syntactically marked
as expressing one specific semantic subcategory, it is very
often the case that CAN is most adequately interpreted as
belonging to the zone where the two imprecise semantic
subcategories overlap.
In text type I CAN only occurs with a passive in the
following main proposition. It should be noted that the
interpretive paraphrase of such examples must necessarily
introduce an X for whom (which) it is possible to carry out
the event expressed by the main proposition, thus in
example (7) above "It is possible for X to avoid further
limits on the extent (...) by means of contract terms (...)".
Such examples are constative, that is, not performative
utterances.
(8) A person cannot by reference to any contract term or to a
notice given to persons generally or to particular persons
exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injury
resulting from negligence (I)
(9) As against a person dealing as consumer, liability in respect
of the goods' correspondence with description or sample,
or their quality or fitness for any particular purpose,
cannot be excluded or restricted by reference to any
such term (I)
In examples like (8) and (9) it is the referent of the subject
noun phrase in the active clause for whom (which) it is
(not) possible to carry out the event expressed by the main
proposition; thus, e.g. in (8),  "It is not possible for a
person by reference (...) to exclude or restrict his liability
(...)". As it is seen here, it is the modal proposition of
possibility which is negated in cases where CAN expresses
root possibility.
(10) In these circumstances the party who alleges and is
able to prove the error in the written contract can
obtain from the court an order of rectification (II)
(11) An effect similar to that of merger in a deed can be
achieved by an unsealed writing which gives effect to
a prior oral agreement (II)
(12) If it is clear that the parties agreed oral terms
additional to those which they wrote down, the court
can analyse the situation as being a contract and a
collateral contract rather than a single contract made partly orally and partly in writing: ...) (II)
(13) The position under the present law can be
summarised as follows (II)
In text type II (Travaux préparatoires) there are quite a few
examples with CAN. In (10) and (11) it expresses root
possibility, in (10) followed by an active verb phrase
expressing the event of the main proposition ("It is
possible for the party who (...) to obtain (...)") and in (11)
followed by a passive verb phrase ("It is possible for X to
achieve an effect similar (...)"). (12) and (13) again
demonstrate the problematic distinction between deontic
and dynamic possibility: is it "It is possible for the court to
analyse (...)" or "The court is able to analyse (...)"? And is it
"It is possible for X to summarise the position (...)" or "X is
able to summarise (...)? As far as I can see, the question is
immaterial here because even though it is certainly
possible in theoretical terms to define the semantic
distinction between these two subcategories, the data
available clearly show that most examples are not
prototypical members of either of the two semantic
subcategories, but are found in the zone where the two
imprecise categories overlap.
(14) We shall see that notwithstanding the fact that there
are a number of defects in the present law and that
uncertainty can arise in some situations (...) the
general approach of the present law by and large provides an effective and satisfactory way of balancing the essential policies (II)
Although CAN does not usually express epistemic modality
in its present tense form9, there are a few examples where
the semantic interpretation seems to indicate a certain
ambiguity between epistemic and root possibility; one of
these is (14). An interpretation like "It is possible that
uncertainty arises (...)" actually seems more likely than a
non-epistemic reading, especially because the subject noun
phrase is non-referential and the noun denotes an abstract
entity; an interpretation like "It is possible for uncertainty
to arise (...)" thus seems very awkward indeed. This, once
again, only underscores the fact that these semantic
subcategories certainly consist of prototypical members,
but that the majority of my data are to be regarded as non-
prototypical rather than prototypical elements in the
semantic subcategories and therefore often occur in
contexts where their relation to a specific semantic
subcategory is indeterminate.
(15) Where the end product is worth more than the cost
of the services there should be an upper limit so that the
party in breach cannot be better off as a result of
partial performance than he would have been had he completely performed the contract (II)
(16) (...) This is because there has been no total failure of
consideration, and money paid cannot be recovered on a
partial failure of consideration (II)
(17) Under the Hire Purchase Act 1965 the lender cannot
recover possession until he has served a notice of default
on the hirer, which has not been complied with (II)
(18) In a strictly logical sense, if the parol evidence rule
applied not only to written contracts it cannot apply to a
writing which, although purporting to be a contract at all,
does not fulfil some legal requirement and (...) (II)
                                                
9 Cf. Coates, 1983; Davidsen-Nielsen, 1990; and Palmer, 1990.
(15)-(18) are examples of CAN in negated clauses. In (15)-
(17) it definitely expresses root possibility, and it is the
modal proposition which is negated. In (15) and (17) the
modal is followed by the active voice in the verb phrase
expressing the main proposition, in (16) it is followed by
the passive. Whereas the other examples are again
indeterminate between deontic and dynamic possibility,
(17) is an example of dynamic possibility (ability). Such
clear examples seem typically to occur where the referent
of the subject noun phrase is animate, especially a human
being and the verb phrase expressing the event of the
main proposition is in the active voice; this is obviously so
because dynamic possibility expresses an inherent
characteristic in the referent of the subject noun phrase
and such characteristics are typically indicated for human
beings who are then also the semantic agent of the event
expressed by the main verb in the verb phrase.
Finally, in (18) cannot expresses epistemic non-
possibility, that is, the modal proposition is negated. It
should be noted that cannot in its epistemic sense may be
a negation of epistemic CAN (cf. the above discussion of
CAN as an expression of epistemic possibility), or it may be
a negation of epistemic MAY (cf. the discussion of may not
below). Examples such as these are rare in the data
material.
So, in text type II CAN typically expresses root
possibility with relatively many examples of indeterminacy
between deontic and dynamic possibility and a few
examples of indeterminacy between epistemic and non-
epistemic (root) possibility. It is not performative and in
negated clauses it is the modal proposition which is
negated.
In text type III (Judgments) there are again a number of
examples where CAN expresses root possibility:
(19) However, counsel for the plaintiff submits that the
law will, so far as it can do so by a monetary reward,
put him in a position to do the next best thing, that is
to say, to supply for himself and on his own land what the defendant has failed to provide on hers(III)
Just as it has been the case in the previous examples with
CAN as an expression of root possibility, there is a certain
indeterminacy between the two subcategories of root
possibility, deontic and dynamic possibility; this is also
seen in (20):
(20) So far as I can ascertain, however, until very recently
it received little attention (III)
Similar to what was stated about (17) above, the examples
where the referent of the subject noun phrase is a human
being and the verb phrase in which the modal occurs is in
the active voice are the ones most likely to be interpreted
as dynamic possibility (ability); thus in (20) "I am able to
ascertain (...)". It should finally be noted here that there is
a range of examples which express unability as in My
Lords, I cannot accept that argument.
(21) Moreover, the criterion of operation in rem hardly
matches counsel's first submission on agreements for
a lease, which operate in personam. It cannot be
because, once vested, a lease cannot be divested except by agreement of the parties (III)
Again, it is the modal proposition which is negated in
negative clauses; the first cannot in (21) expresses
epistemic non-possibility, whereas the second expresses
root non-possibility.
(22) (viii) to do all such other acts and things as may be
incidental or conductive to any of the matters and powers
aforesaid which he may or can lawfully do as agent for
the Company (IV)
CAN is only seen in a few examples in text type IV
(Contracts) and always in its root possibility sense. It is not
performative. In (22) the sequence may or can is an
example of what is known as a binomial expression, cf.
Gustafsson (1984). A binomial is a sequence of two words
which belong to the same form-class, and which are
syntactically coordinated and semantically related.
Binomials are much more frequent in legal discourse than
it is the case for English in general; thus a number of what
could be called typical legal expressions are binomials, e.g.
the following from the promulgation formula: by and with,
advice and consent, (Lords) Spiritual and Temporal.
When I consider the occurrences of modals in binomial
expression in my data together with Gustafsson's
examples, it seems to me that even though the two
elements in such expressions are semantically related, they
do not express exactly the same. This is also the case for
may and can in (22). MAY expresses deontic possibility
(permission) and is a report of a performative MAY, cf.
below, whereas CAN expresses dynamic possibility
(ability), thus the interpretation would be "(...) which he is
permitted and able to lawfully do (...)".
There are a few instances of cannot in text type IV; in all of
them CAN expresses non-performative root possibility and
it is the modal proposition which is negated as in:
(23) "Domestic Relevant Indebtedness" means any
Relevant Indebtedness which (a) is denominated and
payable in, and cannot at the option of any person
become denominated and/or payable in any currency other than, the lawful currency of the Kingdom of Denmark and (...) (IV)
There are no examples of epistemic non-possibility in text
type IV.
In conclusion, the meaning and use of CAN may be
summarised as follows: in the text types analysed here,
CAN typically expresses root possibility, more often than
not the indeterminate zone where deontic and dynamic
possibility overlap. There are a few examples in text type II
where CAN may be interpreted as expressing epistemic
possibility. When a clause including CAN is negated, it is
always a negation of the modal proposition, that is,
CANNOT expresses non-possibility irrespective of whether
it is epistemic or non-epistemic. CAN is not used
performatively.
3.2.  Analysis of MAY
MAY is one of the central modals in legal discourse. In
text type I (Statutes, rules and regulations) it is found
in examples such as these:
(24) In estimating for the purposes of the foregoing
provisions of this section, the amount of any expenses
incurred by any party to the contract, the court may,
without prejudice to the generality of the said provisions, include such sum as appears to be reasonable in respect of overhead 
(25) A person dealing as consumer cannot by reference to
any contract term be made to indemnify another person
(whether a party to the contract or not) in respect of
liability that may be incurred by the other for negligence or breach of contract, except in so far as the contract term satisfies the 
(26) This act may be cited as the Minors' Contracts Act
1987 (I)
In (24)-(26), may expresses root possibility. (24) and (26)
are examples of the kind of performative deontic
possibility known in the legal profession as discretionary
MAY; the legislature is the deontic source that permits the
referent of the subject noun phrase in the active clause to
carry out, at his discretion, the events expressed by the
main propositions; in the case of (24), the court "is
permitted, without prejudice (...) include such sum (...)"; in
the case of (26) X is "permitted to cite the act (...)".
Even though MAY is formally used in a discretionary
and not in a compulsory sense, it is very often the case,
however, that the differences between MAY and SHALL in
their performative uses in legal documents are marginal,
cf. Words and Phrases Legally Defined, 3rd edition, Vol. 3
and 4. Hence, despite the fact that the event expressed by
be cited in (26) is the main proposition of a modal of
deontic possibility rather than necessity, it should be
interpreted almost as a compulsion rather than a
permission; in this case the law must in actual fact be cited
as the Minors' Contracts Act 1987 and not in any other
way.
In (25) may expresses constative deontic possibility of
permission, that is, the result/report of a performative act
of giving permission rather than the performative act
itself.
In text type I MAY thus expresses either the
performative, discretionary MAY of deontic possibility or
the constative MAY of deontic possibility / permission
which may be seen as a result of the performative use of
the same modal. There are no examples of MAY as an
epistemic modal or of MAY NOT in this text type.
In text type II (Travaux préparatoires) MAY expresses
different subcategories under the modal operator of
possibility:
(27) We would point out that consideration need not only
consist in promising to pay a sum of money but may also
consist in promising to do some other act to forbear
from doing something (II)
(28) In time the courts may well reformulate what is now
known as the doctrine of substantial performance (II)
(27)-(28) are examples of MAY expressing epistemic
possibility. Modals express epistemic modality in relation
to "here and now", that is, the time of the utterance, and
there is a temporal element of simultaneity and/or futurity
in such modal expressions. This is especially obvious in
(28) where the adverbial underscores the futurity feature.
All the above examples express a modal proposition "It is
possible that p". They are constative utterances.
MAY also expresses deontic possibility in text type II:
(29) In our working paper (...) we made a provisional
recommendation that the sum payable to the party in
breach in accordance with the new remedy which was
proposed should be reduced, or as the case may be 
extinguished by the damages to which the other party may be
entitled in respect of the breach of contract (II)
(30) On these facts X may not recover the £5,000 nor any
proportion of it. If the first builder has acted in breach
of contract in leaving the site X may sue him for damages
which are likely to be assessed at £ 1,000 (II)
The first may in (29) (as the case may be) expresses
epistemic possibility. The second may in (29) and in (30)
express constative deontic possibility, that is, permission
as a result of a previous performative act.
As it is seen both in (25) above and in (29)-(30) MAY
may express deontic possibility of permission which is
interpreted as a result of a performative act of giving
permission. This is in contrast to CAN of root possibility
which focusses more on the possibility for somebody/-
thing (or even the ability of the referent of the subject
noun phrase) to carry out the event of the main
proposition. The distinction which I am trying to make
here is admittedly subtle, and one is often faced with
indeterminate examples; in spite of that I will still claim
that the empirical data lead me to the conclusion that
there is typically such a distinction in the corpus data, cf.
also example (31):
(31) Under the present law the buyer can refuse to pay,
or may recover the price if he has already paid it (II)
I would interpret can in (31) as expressing root
possibility and may as expressing constative permission as
a result of a previous performative act of giving
permission.
Another problem is the indeterminacy between
epistemic and root possibility expressed by means of MAY
when it is not performative and when the event of the
main proposition is a passive verb phrase:
(32) We considered the justification of the present law
but we think that it loses some of its force in view of
the fact that the mischief which we have identified is
not that the parties can require complete performance before any counter-performance is due, but that under the present
(33) The situation may be analysed either as a single
contract contained in two documents, one of which was
inaccurate because inconsistent with the true
agreement as reflected in the other (...) (II)
At least out of context, may in both (32) and (33) seems to
be indeterminate between epistemic and root possibility.
However, a closer look at the context solves the problem in
(32) where may is coordinated with will; since the latter no
doubt expresses epistemic predictability (prediction), may
must also express epistemic modality, i.e. possibility,
because it must be assumed that coordinated modals will
express either the same modal operator with a difference
in the type of modality, or the same type of modality with
different modal operators - irrespective of whether they
occur in regular binomial expressions or in constructions
like the one seen in this example. (33) seems more truely
indeterminate.
The central modals can only occur as the operator in a
finite verb phrase because of their defective morphology.
This does not mean, however, that the main proposition
following a modal proposition cannot in itself be
modalized; this is seen in (34):
(34) If the parties make a contract which must be in a
certain form, it may be possible to have a collateral
contract which is not in that form (II)
may expresses epistemic possibility and be possible root
possibility in the following proposition. As far as I can see
on the basis of the data I have collected, the first modal
expression in such examples (in this case may) expresses
epistemic modality, whereas the second modal expression
(in this case be possible) expresses non-epistemic modality.
Hence it is possible by means of an epistemic modal
expression to evaluate the truth value of a proposition
which is in itself modalized under the condition that the
embedded modal proposition is non-epistemic.
There are a few examples with MAY NOT in text type II:
(35) Our reservation therefore is that the elaborate
structure of the present law may not be really necessary
to protect minors against the dangers which they face in
practice (II)
(36) The second general rule is that contracts made with
a minor are binding on the adult party. The minor may
enforce them. He may not, however, do so by means of
a decree of specific performance (II)
may in (35) expresses epistemic possibility and it is the
following proposition that is negated, "It is possible that
the elaborate structure of the present law is not really
necessary (...)"; in (36) it expresses constative deontic
possibility and it is the modal proposition that is negated.
Where non-negated and negated MAY are coordinated,
they express the same kind of modality, in (37) and (38)
epistemic possibility:
(37) This may, or may not, be true (II)
(38) He may, or may not, have known of the car's true
condition (II)
In text type II we thus typically find MAY expressing
epistemic possibility or constative root possibility which is
a result of a previous performative act of giving
permission. When used in combination with NOT as an
epistemic modal, the negation applies to the main
proposition; when used as a non-epistemic modal, the
negation applies to the modal proposition.
In text type III (Judgments) we find examples such as
the following with epistemic MAY:
(39) Thirdly, although I appreciate that there may come a
time when the third party or some other owner of the plot
may erect a house there, I have to bear in mind that the
covenant in the present case is 12 years old and no house
has been erected yet nor is there any certainty that one ever will be erected. Indeed, it seems that there may now be difficulties in obtaining 
to the contract specification (III)
(40) Is is perhaps not altogether surprising that the jury
may have had some difficulty, for (...) (III)
As it appears from (39) and (40) examples with epistemic
MAY are legio; there are also a few examples with MAY as a
constative deontic modal of possibility as in (41):
(41) As I understand Hyde v Wrench (...) and the cases
which have followed, the consequences of placing the
order in that way, if I may adopt Megaw J's words (...)
was 'to kill the quotation' (III)
(42) Although this is not an occasion for an extended
discussion of the decisions in those two cases, Law v
Jones (...) appears to have occasioned so much
misunderstanding that perhaps I may be permitted to make certain explanatory observations about it (III)
(43) I may perhaps add that I see no reason to dissent
from (...) (III)
may in (41) expresses constative deontic possibility of
permission, and the same goes for (42) and (43) where the
modal element is underscored by other modal elements in
the clause; in (42) the passive verb phrase be permitted
and the modal adverbial perhaps, in (43) only the modal
adverbial; perhaps seems to express epistemic possibility,
cf. Perkins (1983:89-93). In contrast to the examples of
modal expression + modal expression quoted from text
type II above, cf. (34), the two modal expressions in (42),
that is, may be permitted seem to express the same
modality and can only be interpreted as a means to
(politely) underscore the constative deontic modality of
the utterance.
(44) I am satisfied from the authorities that the
fundamental purpose of the Mareva jurisdiction is to
prevent foreign parties from causing assets to be 
removed from the jurisdiction in order to avoid the risk of
having to satisfy any judgment which may be entered
against them in pending proceedings in this country (III)
In (44) there is again an example of indeterminacy
between epistemic and non-epistemic possibility where the
utterance is constative and the modal is followed by the
passive voice in the verb phrase of the main proposition.
(45) Since 1955 the use of telex communication has been
greatly expanded, and there are many variants on it. The
senders and recipients may not be the principals to
the contemplated contract. They may be servants or agents with limited authority. The message may not reach, or be intended to 
(46) On April 6 1981 the tenants issued a motion for
leave to discontinue their proceedings for a new
tenancy. RSC Ord 21, r 3, provides that, with exceptions not
here material, a party may not discontinue an action, whether begun by writ or otherwise, without the leave of the court (...) 
As it appears from (45) and (46), NOT in combination with
epistemic MAY again results in a negation of the main
proposition, in combination with deontic MAY a negation
of the modal proposition.
In text type III, then, MAY occurs as en epistemic modal
of possibility or constative deontic modal expressing
permission as a result of a previous performative act.
Where epistemic MAY occurs in combination with NOT, it
is the main proposition which is negated, where deontic
MAY occurs with NOT, the modal proposition is negated.
The following examples stem from text type IV
(Contracts):
(47) The plant shall be under the control of the Hirer at
all times from delivery until re-delivery and the Hirer
shall ensure that the plant is used safely and without
risk to health, is used by competent and duly licensed operators as the case may be and is not used for any purpose fo
(48) The company may deduct from the employee's
remuneration the amount of any sickness benefit payment
to which the employee shall be entitled by reason of such
absence under the social security legislation for the time being and from time to time in force and the employee shall inform the 
(49) The employee agrees to advise the company of his
whereabouts so that he may be reached at any
reasonable time and the employee agrees to serve the
company exclusively at all times required by the company.(IV)
In (47) may expresses epistemic possibility, in (48)
performative deontic possibility ("The company may at its
discretion deduct ...") and in (49) constative deontic
possibility ("It is possible for X / the company to reach the
employee (...)"); in the following examples, MAY is negated
(which is rare in text type IV):
(50) If, in the opinion of the Company, the Distributor's
financial condition at any time may not justify continuance
of the work to be performed by the Company hereunder
on the agreed terms of payment, the Company may require
full or partial payment in advance (...) (IV)
(51) The purchaser may not transfer his licence or
authorise any other person save members of his
immediate family to occupy any part of the property (IV)
The data only supply examples of NOT in combination
with epistemic MAY where the main proposition is negated
as in (50) or with performative deontic MAY where the
modal proposition is negated as in (51).
In text type IV MAY is thus used in all the modal
subcategories we have seen so far: epistemic possibility,
performative deontic possibility (performing the act of
giving permission at the discretion of the agent carrying
out the event of the main proposition), or constative
deontic possibility which is typically a result of a previous
performative act of granting permission. In order to
determine whether MAY expresses performative or
constative deontic possibility, one must take into
consideration the non-linguistic element of sender-receiver
relations in combination with the immediate linguistic
context. Epistemic MAY NOT negates the event of the main
proposition, whereas deontic MAY NOT negates the modal
proposition.
4. Conclusion
In the above I have accounted for the use of the modals
CAN and MAY in the four text types 1. Statutes, rules and
regulations, 2. Travaux Préparatoires, 3. Judgments, and 4.
Contracts. In each case it was indicated whether the
modals formed part of a constative or a performative
utterance and, in cases of negation, whether the modal or
the following main proposition was negated. The use of
these two modals which (together with their past tense
counterparts COULD and MIGHT, cf. Lauridsen (in
preparation)) express the modal operator of possibility,
may be summarized as follows: of the two, only MAY
expresses epistemic possibility. Deontic possibility may be
subdivided into at least three categories: A performative
deontic possibility by means of which permission is
granted and a constative deontic possibility of permission
which is the result of a previous performative act; these
two subcategories are expressed by means of MAY. The
interpretation of MAY as performative or constative in
such cases relies heavily on the immediate linguistic
context as well as the situational context of especially
sender-receiver relations. Constative deontic possibility
which is also termed root possibility is typically expressed
by means of CAN and so is the dynamic possibility, also
termed ability.
It must be stressed again that these categories should
be regarded as Boolean, and there are numerous examples
of indeterminacy between them, especially between
epistemic and non-performative deontic MAY and between
constative deontic possibility (root possibility) and
dynamic possibility (ability). There are a few cases of
indeterminacy between epistemic and dynamic CAN.
In this paper I have focussed on the meaning and use of
MAY and CAN in positive and negative clauses and on the
semantic and, to a certain extent, functional distinction
between the two. There are obviously a whole range of
problems which I have not been able to discuss in such a
relatively short paper; among these are the semantic
relations between CAN and MAY and their past tense
counterparts COULD and MIGHT, or the semantic relation
between the so-called discretionary MAY and the
mandatory SHALL of legal discourse. As far as speech act
theory is concerned, I have assumed without discussion
that the texts are master speech acts (cf. Fotion (1971) and
Kurzon (1986)), that is, that the text as a whole forms a
superordinate speech act within which is embedded a
range of subordinate speech acts. As a general rule, a
master speech act determines the kinds of subordinate
speech acts acceptable within itself. Space does not permit
an elaboration of this point here; there is no doubt,
however, that further functional analyses can throw more
light on the meaning and use of the modals in legal and all
other types of discourse.
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